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Germany has voted this fall and the old government happens to stay in office albeit only by a 
very small margin. This outcome was certainly surprising for political economists who 
believe that voters are strongly influenced by economics in their voting decision considering 
the poor economic record of the red-green government concerning economic growth in 
general and labor market performance in particular. In contrast to a number of other European 
countries and especially in contrast to the US, Germany appears to be unable to make almost 
any progress in reforming labor market institutions and the welfare state in order to reduce its 
stubbornly high unemployment rates. It forms in this respect an unholy triple alliance of 
reform laggards with France and Italy (Minford and Naraidoo, 2002). However, topics outside 
of the realm of economics seem to have swayed swing voters in favor of Schröder. 
Furthermore, the conservative opposition only kept reminding Schröder of the fact that he had 
not been able to fulfill his promise in 1998 of cutting official unemployment down to 3.5 
million. In contrast to the rather small liberal party, the conservatives did not offer a radically 
different agenda for economic policy so that it did not become clear why they should be much 
more successful in improving labor market performance. This doubt was reinforced by the 
fact that the conservatives spent sixteen consecutive years in government from 1982 to 1998 
without putting labor market institutions and the welfare state on the right track.  
 
Realizing that something must be done with respect to the labor market chancellor Schröder 
initiated the so-called ”Hartz-Kommission” just about half a year before the election and 
promised that its proposals would be put into action during the next term. This was certainly a 
very shrewd political move since the public at large could not really judge in time for the 
election whether its proposals made economic sense, but it got the impression that something 
serious would be done about unemployment after the election. However, German labor 
market experts are almost unanimous in their judgment that the “Hartz-Kommission” just 
made useful proposals with respect to improving the matching process between the 
unemployed and vacancies, which is only a very minor part of the German unemployment 
problem, though. This can already be recognized by the fact that the number of unemployed 
persons outnumbers vacancies by a factor of almost three to one when taking into account 
official unemployment and by a factor of four to one when hidden unemployment is also 
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taken into account. The economic problems of Germany are much more fundamental than just 
a lack of efficiency in the matching process on the labor market and there appears to be a 
serious shortage of political determination among both big parties in actually addressing these 
problems via fundamental structural reforms which are likely to hurt influential special 
interest groups.  
 
Persistently high unemployment rates are just one side of the coin of an overall economic 
performance which is far from satisfactory. The other side of the coin is the lackluster 
performance with respect to growth rates, where Germany was in the course of the nineties 
not only outperformed by the US, but again also by a number of other European countries. 
This has been the case even though the “Neue Länder” should according to standard growth 
theory command over particularly high growth rates based on catch-up just like the “Alte 
Länder” did in the fifties and sixties. The German economy lacks the robustness and vitality 
of the Erhard era. It still relies very much on its competitive edge in medium-high technology 
trade, but it is weak in areas of high technology, such as computers, communication 
technology and biotechnology. It should therefore not be surprising that with respect to 
economics Germany, which used to be the economic powerhouse in the EU, is increasingly 
called the “sick man of Europe” suggesting that something is rotten in its institutional setting.  
 
Yet, the German concept of “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” used to be very successful with respect 
to both, labor market performance and growth rates, at least until the seventies if not even 
until the eighties, reconciling the interests of organized labor and capital. Some thirty years 
ago German institutions along with its low unemployment rates and social cohesion were the 
envy of the world. Its unemployment rate was about one fifth of that in the US which was 
then about the same as it is today. Germany today features an unemployment rate which is 
about twice as high as the rate in the US, but also other European countries such as the UK, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands or Denmark have been much more successful in fighting 
unemployment or in keeping unemployment at acceptable levels. This fact is a hint that 
capitalism is not single peaked with one institutional setting being superior under all 
circumstances and at all times (Freeman, 2001). Furthermore, since German labor market 
institutions have by and large been kept unchanged over the last thirty years, only their 
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interaction with changes in the economic environment is a plausible candidate for explaining 
rising unemployment. This is in fact the gist of a number of recent papers.
1  
 
Considering that well-designed institutions are a key factor for a good economic performance 
in the longer run, there are two types of explanations for this discrepancy between the past 
and the present economic performance of Germany relative to other OECD countries. First, 
German institutions might have worsened over time relative to other countries or even in 
absolute terms, reflecting the negative influence of special interest groups on political 
decision making in this country. The German economy is by now infamous among 
international policy observers for its excessive level of regulation, taxation and 
bureaucratization which not only distorts but also greatly reduces incentives to work in 
general, but especially to take riks such as investing in skills, in new firms or in venture 
capital. Second, the economic environment might have changed so that a formerly appropriate 
German institutional setup fostering GDP and employment growth is no longer conducive to 
achieving these goals. There is widespread evidence that the new economy of the twenty-first 
century, which has globalization and great technological advancement as its hallmarks, is 
characterized by greater variability and heterogeneity as well as more rapid change so that 
more institutional flexibility is called for (Heckman, 2002). 
 
We experience an era of creative destruction with greater risk but also greater return in 
countries which get their act together. This creates great economic opportunities for countries 
with an appropriately flexible institutional environment which do not artificially try to 
preserve obsolete economic activities and foster in all respects the creation of new modes of 
production, such as via featuring sufficiently large incentives to invest in skills in response to 
skill-biased technological change or in new firms in response to structural change. However, 
the whole institutional setting in Germany is geared to preserving the status quo and to 
fostering stability, long-term relationships and an egalitarian income distribution thus 
impeding Germany from responding flexibly and quickly to these challenges and from 
making full use of the opportunities created by the new economic environment. There appears 
to be too much “social insurance” and too little reward for entrepreneurial risk taking in 
Germany thus stifling economic creativity and opportunities for growth. 
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This paper will discuss the repercussions of the German institutional setting on labor market 
performance. It will argue that German labor market institutions alone and their relative 
evolution over time cannot explain the dramatic reversals in labor market performance 
relative to other OECD countries but especially relative to the US. This is only possible if, 
first, the interaction of particular labor market institutions with relevant shocks, which have 
occurred over the last three decades, is taken into account, and if, second, institutions beyond 
the labor market such as those on the goods and the capital market and their interaction with 
the changing economic environment are also considered. It is too simple to argue that 
persistently high unemployment in Germany is due to the fact that labor costs are too high, 
real wages too rigid and the wage structure too compressed. Although all three factors are of 
course crucial, these are transmission mechanisms rather than the actual causes of the ongoing 
economic malaise of Germany. The actual causes must be found in the complex web of 
institutions which have made the German economy sclerotic and which are not appropriate for 
creating employment opportunities for less qualified workers and for coping with the 
challenges created by the new economic environment thus giving rise to the lackluster 
economic performance of Germany.       
 
To this end the paper proceeds as follows. The second chapter highlights some stylized facts 
about German unemployment. The third chapter points out which major shocks have occurred 
and how they interact with German labor market institutions to produce rising unemployment. 
The fourth chapter shows why institutions beyond the labor market are also relevant in this 
context. The last chapter provides conclusions.  
   
     
II. Some Stylized Facts on German Unemployment 
 
Unemployment has ratcheted upwards over the last three decades in Germany (figure 1). At 
the beginning of the 1970s Germany enjoyed a situation of full employment with negligible 
officially recorded unemployment rates. This was in marked contrast to the US which already 
back then had a “natural rate of unemployment” or Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment (NAIRU) in the order of five percent. Like in other countries, unemployment 
jumped upwards with each negative shock like the two oil price shocks or changes in 
monetary policy towards a more restrictive, antiinflationary course. Unlike in a number of   5
other countries, though, Germany has over the last thirty years been almost completely unable 
to reduce its unemployment rate back to pre-shock levels when economic conditions 
improved again. The total official number of unemployed is currently slightly above the four 
million mark with a bit less than two million people participating in active labor market 
programs. Around six million jobs are therefore missing. According to latest OECD figures, 
the standardized unemployment rate in Germany in 2002 is 8.3%.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Structural unemployment in Germany displays a strongly rising trend over the last thirty years 
which can be seen by the straight line in figure 1 which connects troughs of unemployment in 
booms. Thus, unemployment displayed a high degree of asymmetric persistence if not even 
hysteresis in Germany. It is furthermore striking to note that Germany’s unemployment rate 
almost continuously increased over the 1990s and into the 21
st century whereas other 
countries such as the US, the UK or the Netherlands were much more successful over this 
time period in producing employment growth and in reducing their unemployment rates 
which is often associated with their more favorable institutional environment compared to 
Germany not only for producing low-wage jobs but also for moving towards the so-called 
“new economy”. 
 
It is important to note that this negative development on the German labor market cannot be 
attributed to differences in the size of the working age population or the participation rates 
among working age people (Solow, 2000). Hence, it would be wrong to argue that labor 
supply has risen so much in Germany, no wonder that labor demand could not expand by an 
equivalent amount. An extreme version of this thinking is reflected in the folly notion of a 
lump sum of labor which argues that unemployment can only be solved by dividing more 
equally among workers a given pie of labor demand. A view across the border or even across 
the Atlantic helps to sort out things. Population growth as well as growth in the employment-
to-population ratio have been considerably larger, e.g., in the US compared to Germany 
(figure 2). The difference is especially striking among women. Although the participation rate 
of women in the regular labor market has of course also increased in Germany over the last 
three decades, but it is still much less than in countries such as the US, the UK or the 
Netherlands. Since international comparisons suggest that rising labor supply cannot be an 
actual cause of growing German labor market problems, deficient labor demand and/or rising   6
problems for labor supply and labor demand to match must be at the heart of the German 
unemployment problem.    
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
There is widespread consensus that the bulk of the rise in unemployment in Germany is due to 
structural causes (table 1), i.e., that it is related to excessive real wage costs to firms, lack of 
wage differentiation, rising mismatch problems etc. and that it cannot be successfully fought 
by simply expanding goods demand even if that were possible. Estimates for the NAIRU in 
Germany indicate that eighty to ninety percent of total unemployment is due to structural 
causes. Hence, the emphasis in fighting unemployment cannot lie in a discussion about how 
goods demand can be expanded, but must rather be put on the question which institutions are 
to blame for this assessment and in which way these institutions should be reformed to obtain 
better results on the labor market. Institutions directly related to the labor market such as labor 
market and welfare state regulations should naturally be put under particularly close scrutiny 
(Siebert, 1997), but they are not the only ones which might be relevant. There is sometimes 
the naïve belief that unemployment must be due to a defect in the labor market, as if the hole 
in a flat tire must always be at the bottom, because that is where the tire is flat (Solow, 2000). 
Already A. Marshall emphasized that also the institutional structures on goods and capital 
markets affect labor market performance (Heckman, 2002).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
A look at the development of the Beveridge curve for Germany reveals that there has first of 
all been a massive movement downwards, i.e., the officially recorded unemployment rate has 
increased much more than the officially recorded vacancy rate (figure 3).
2 Such a movement 
downwards along a given Beveridge curve can be due to two reasons. First, lack of goods 
demand can simultaneously depress vacancies and increase unemployment. Given the brief 
discussion in the preceding paragraph, this is unlikely to be the major cause of this marked 
downward movement over the last about thirty years. To be more precise, even if the original 
push towards higher aggregate unemployment came from the demand side, the well-known 
hysteresis mechanisms convert an originally cyclical rise into structural unemployment after a 
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few years if the cyclical downturn cannot be reverted quickly enough. Second, rising real 
wage costs to firms exceeding trend productivity growth reduce vacancies and raise 
unemployment which is then typically called classical unemployment. Given the rapid rise in 
wage costs in Germany relative to other countries (figure 4) and the marked tendency in 
Germany to substitute labor by capital (Berthold, Fehn and Thode, 2002) this seems more 
likely to be the ultimate cause for the observed downward movement in the u-v-plane.  
 
[Figure 3 & 4 about here] 
 
There has in addition been an outward shift of the Beveridge curve, i.e., the same vacancy rate 
corresponds with a considerably higher unemployment rate today than ten or even twenty 
years ago. Such an outward shift of the Beveridge curve is usually caused by rising mismatch 
problems, i.e. the characteristics of the unemployed fit less well with the available vacancies 
than in the past. All three standard types of mismatch unemployment seem to play a major 
role in Germany, mismatch according to region, sector and qualification. Reunification led to 
a substantial regional mismatch problem in Germany as unemployment shot up in the “Neue 
Länder” due to a number of reasons, some important ones of which are related to clear policy 
mistakes such as the conversion of the Ostmark into the DM at a highly overvalued rate and a 
policy of rapid wage equalization between the “Neue” and the “Alte Länder”. However, 
Germany already had a non-negligible rise in regional mismatch problems even before 
reunification because unemployment had already back then tended to increase more in the 
North than in the South of the “Alte Länder” (table 2).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Rising mismatch unemployment must also be attributed to increasing sectoral mismatch. 
Employment in the industrial sector has been shrinking more in Germany than in most other 
OECD countries without an equivalently strong rise of employment in the service sector 
(figure 5). There is a strong unsatisfied demand in particular for household related services 
while it is very difficult for unemployed industrial workers to find a job in their original field 
of employment again. It is nonetheless still much more attractive for people to work in the 
strongly unionized, high productivity industrial sector because a typical industrial worker can 
earn a much higher wage in the industrial sector compared to the service sector. This 
assessment hinges of course on the realistic assumption that jobs in the service sector with a   8
high qualification profile such as auditing or consulting are not available for the concerned 
industrial workers. Unemployed industrial workers are very reluctant to work in the service 
sector and especially young males still prefer to enter into an apprenticeship in the industrial 
sector. The peak of absurdity in this respect takes place in coal mining where miners earn 
higher wages than even their counterparts in most of the industrial sector and of course much 
higher wages than anybody else of similar qualification in the service sector. All this must be 
seen against the background that coal mining is not at all profitable in Germany and that the 
whole sector can only exist due to heavy hidden and explicit government subsidies which 
have, by the way, been declared off limits for any cuts in the current new term by the red-
green government despite of its serious budgetary problems. Based on such folly policy, 
young people are still trained to become miners thus continuing to burn other people’s money.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Like in many other countries, unemployment in Germany is also very much and increasingly 
concentrated among people with little or no formal qualification for the labor market pointing 
to rising qualificational mismatch (figure 6). The fact that this concentration has even 
increased over time reflects a shift of labor demand towards more skilled labor possibly due to 
globalization and/or labor saving technical progress since the relative supply of skilled labor 
has risen in the course of the last decades. The main dividing line in Germany still appears to 
be the apprenticeship system meaning that the probability of being unemployed or of ending 
up in long-term unemployment is much lower if someone has successfully finished a formal 
apprenticeship. Roughly fifty percent of the long-term unemployed have no such formal 
qualification via the apprenticeship system. However, even people who do have such a 
qualification are getting into greater trouble concerning their employment prospects. 
Unemployment rates among the group with medium type qualification have also increased 
quite a bit more than among those with university education with no equivalent rise in 
vacancies for this type of medium qualification.  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Long-term unemployment, i.e. individual unemployment spells which exceed one year, is an 
especially severe problem in Germany. The percentage of the unemployed, who have been 
jobless for more than one year, has been hovering around fifty percent for a number of years   9
by now according to OECD classification, which is exceptionally high by international 
comparison (table 3). Up to now there is little indication that Germany might in the near 
future be able to significantly reduce its record rates of long-term unemployment. Hence, the 
labor market is very much segmented in Germany in insiders, i.e., those who have a regular 
and well-protected and well-endowed job, and outsiders, i.e., those who have been 
unemployed for more than a year and whose chances of ever getting back into the regular 
labor market are not only slim but also diminishing by each additional day spent in 
unemployment. In between are the short-term unemployed whose interests might still play 
some role in wage setting and who might still have a reasonably high probability of getting a 
regular job again.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
High rates of long-term unemployment such as in Germany but also, e.g., in the otherwise 
much more successful Netherlands, are of course a severe economic and social problem. 
Long-term unemployment is not only draining the resources of the welfare state, but it also 
constitutes a huge economic waste. It can in contrast to frictional short-term unemployment 
not be justified by matching arguments, i.e., that this kind of unemployment would be 
necessary to allow for an optimal search time for a new job. The people concerned are as a 
rule forced to stay idle against their will. They do not only contribute nothing to producing 
output but financing them via taxes and social security contributions actually reduces output 
due to the resulting distortions of work incentives. It is noteworthy in this respect that the total 
marginal rate of taxation of labor is extremely high in Germany in international comparison 
(figure 7). Last but not least, high rates of long-term unemployment are socially divisive and 
tend to undermine political stability.   
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Germany has a very peculiar age profile among the unemployed (table 4). Unemployment 
among teenagers is lower compared to most other OECD countries. This can probably 
attributed at least partly to the apprenticeship system in which young people only receive very 
low wages but are still most of the time available for firms for a wide range of jobs including 
menial work. Unemployment rates increase markedly among tweenies when the 
apprenticeship ends and when as a rule collectively agreed upon regular union wages have to   10
be paid by firms. Firms therefore naturally restrict offers for continuing employment under 
the regular terms to those apprentices who have made sufficient progress concerning their 
productivity for increasing the net value of the firm later on even when they receive union 
wages. German unemployment or non-employment rates are also rather striking at the other 
end of the age spectrum. Unemployment or non-employment is very high among people of 
the age group 55 and above which is a result of the extremely generous rules of the welfare 
state concerning unemployment benefits and early pension regulations for elderly people. 
This very low participation rate among elderly workers appears to be unsustainable when 
considering the combination of low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
All these stylized facts concerning unemployment in Germany must be seen against the 
background of how real wage costs of firms and wage differentiation developed. Real wage 
costs to firms rose much more over the last three decades in Germany than in almost all other 
OECD countries especially compared to countries like the US or the Netherlands which have 
been much more successful concerning labor market performance (figure 8). This hardly 
reflects an equivalently higher trend growth rate of labor productivity in Germany considering 
that technological knowledge spreads quickly at least among OECD countries and also 
considering that recent international comparisons of education tests as PISA revealed that 
Germany is not in the top group in preparing well its young people for working life. This 
development must rather be attributed to higher wage cost pressure be it due to union wage 
demands or due to rising costs for financing an overly generous welfare state. Firms react of 
course to such high wage cost pressure among other things via increasing the capital intensity 
of production. This raises labor productivity on the firm level ex post but should not be 
construed to indicate that wage cost pressure was economically justified ex ante because 
unemployment rises as well and aggregate labor productivity might even fall when, as would 
be appropriate, the unemployed are also taken into account in the denominator.  
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Germany is furthermore among the few OECD countries where wage differentiation 
according to qualification did not increase over the 1990s but actually decreased (figure 9). 
There has also been no noticeable increase in sectoral wage differentiation probably due to   11
pattern bargaining of the different sectors of the economy making wage bargaining more 
centralized than strictly sectoral wage bargaining. Regional wage differentiation among the 
“Alte Länder” is negligible in firms which pay union wages. There is still some regional wage 
differentiation between the “Alte” and the “Neue Länder” usually in the order of ten 
percentage points. Unions are fighting hard to get rid of even this little regional wage 
differentiation which can be seen by wages growing faster in the “Neue Länder” (figure 10) 
even though employment in the “Neue Länder” is exhibiting a strong downward trend (figure 
11). Especially public sector workers, who are completely sheltered from market forces, are 
pushing for rapid equalization of wages between the two regions as can be seen by the recent 
catalog of demands by the union Verdi which includes public sector workers in its 
constituency. If Verdi is successful it must be expected that this will then have repercussions 
on other sectors with the predictable result that unemployment will rise even further in the 
“Neue Länder” considering the vast gulf in labor productivity. 
 
[Figures 9 & 10 & 11 about here] 
 
III. The Interaction of German Labor Market Institutions with Shocks  
 
1. Which Shocks? 
 
Wages, which are inappropriate from the perspective of attaining full employment, in all its 
different facets - excessive real wage cost pressure on firms, wage rigidities of all kinds, lack 
of wage differentiation, excessive reservation wages etc. – lead to rising structural 
unemployment. However, it is from a policy point of view crucial to find out which labor 
market institutions give rise to such inappropriate wages. Furthermore, a large number of 
investigations, e.g., by the OECD, concerning the evolution of labor market institutions in 
continental European countries and especially Germany show that there has in fact been very 
little change in labor market institions in the course of the last decades. There has been above 
all institutional continuity. The UK with its substantial labor market reforms in the Thatcher 
era is the exception rather than the rule. Hence, there must have been major economic shocks 
in this time period which conflict with, e.g., the German instititional setting on the labor 
market, thus causing inappropriate wages and in the end rising unemployment. There are at 
least five major candidates for such shocks.     12
 
First, there are the well-known and much cited oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 which 
constituted negative aggregate supply shocks for a country like Germany. Total factor along 
with labor productivity growth slowed down in the wake of these oil price shocks thus 
reducing the scope for real wage increases without employment losses or even required real 
wage cuts. Countries with labor market institutions which give rise to sticky real wage 
aspirations and real wage rigidities were bound to experience lasting increases in 
unemployment rates as a result. 
 
Second, the Fed in the US under Paul Volcker, the German Bundesbank as well as monetary 
authorities in a number of other OECD countries shifted course in their monetary policy 
stance in the early eighties making the fight against inflation their top priority. As inflation 
only decreased gradually over time, though, it was not possible to reverse this negative 
demand shock quickly enough to prevent hysteresis mechanisms from setting in. Hence, the 
scope for employment neutral real wage increases was further reduced. Subsequently, there 
occurred in fact a lasting rise in real interest rates in the eighties which made it in addition 
necessary that unions accepted a falling labor share. Unemployment increased if labor market 
institutions were such that workers resisted this change in relative factor rewards.  
 
Third, substantial shifts in the structure of labor demand took place over the eighties and 
nineties which increased the importance of flexible wage structures. Labor market institutions 
which tend to make wage structures rigid and tend to compress wage differentials have thus 
become more costly in terms of unemployment. Labor demand has been shifting not only 
from the industrial to the service sector but firms have also been increasing their 
qualificational requirements when hiring employees. Both movements are closely linked to 
the ongoing process of globalization and to labor saving technical progress. Germany was 
furthermore hit by a particularly severe shock concerning the regional structure of labor 
demand, i.e., by reunification. Due to the disastrous economic policies during the socialist era 
in the GDR, labor demand by firms relative to working age population was and actually 
continues to be much lower in the “Neue Länder” relative to the “Alte Länder”. Labor market 
institutions such as centralized wage negotiations which tend to compress regional wage 
differentials have therefore become particularly problematic for Germany.  
   13
Fourth, the economic environment appears to have become more volatile over the eighties and 
nineties with an increasing likelihood of firm-specific shocks. This is also reflected in the 
well-documented fact of a rising instability of workers’ earnings and a falling ability of firms 
to offer their employees lifetime employment (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994). There has in 
particular been a large increase in both the permanent and transitory components of earning 
variation leading to a rise in cross-section earnings inequality in the US with its relatively 
unregulated labor market. In addition, the earnings losses of workers who have involuntarily 
separated from their jobs have also increased documenting a reduced transferability of human 
capital across firms. Labor market institutions which conflict with this greater microeconomic 
turbulence give rise to increasing unemployment.
3 
 
Fifth, the nineties witnessed the arrival of the so-called new economy which many observers 
classify as a new “Kondratieff Cycle” based on the IT revolution, the internet and the rising 
importance of such sectors as biotechnology, telecommunication and knowledged-based 
industries in general. The new economy not only reinforced the trend toward greater 
economic turbulence but it also further raised the importance of human capital in a broad 
sense including especially verbal, cognitive and communication skills, proficiency in working 
with computers as well as versatility in performing different tasks and in working in teams. 
Interestingly, soft skills which are harder to prove via certificates gained in weight relative to 
hard skills thus producing a potential conflict with labor market institutions which enforce 
wage equality across individuals belonging to certain categories based on certificates and 
tenure. In a nutshell, this is an era of creative destruction with greater risks but also potentially 
larger returns, destroying the old ways of producing and trading but also creating vast new 
opportunities for entrepreneurial success. Hallmark features of this new economy are 
heterogeneity, diversity, variability and the importance of risk taking. This new economy 
raises the costs in terms of output and employment losses of excessive systems of social 
insurance and of clinging to the status quo. Hence, the whole institutional setting, including 
labor market institutions, must promote entrepreneurial risk taking and economic change in 
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2. Which Labor Market Institutions? 
 
German labor market institutions are heavily criticized these days for being outdated and for 
being far too rigid. In fact, in its ranking of both OECD countries and emerging countries 
concerning labor market flexibility the Fraser Institute puts Germany in the last place thus 
stating that Germany has the dubious honor of having the most rigid labor market among all 
the 58 countries looked at (Gwartney and Lawson 2001). Although it is of course debatable 
whether this particular position in the ranking is in fact justified, the general message is clear 
enough and beyond doubt: Germany’s rigid labor market institutions are stifling GDP and 
employment growth. In the following, three key labor market institutions are put under closer 
scrutiny, insurance and transfer payments to the unemployed, centralization of wage 
bargaining and employment protection legislation.  
 
a. Insurance and transfer payments to the unemployed 
 
In international comparative studies it is shown again and again that the generosity of 
insurance and transfer payments to the unemployed is a key determinant for the extent and 
duration of unemployment in a country.
4 The longer benefits are paid, the higher these 
benefits are and the less restrictive the criteria are that govern what is expected of an 
unemployed person in order to be granted these benefits, the higher is the level of 
unemployment and in particular of long-term unemployment. The economic mechanisms 
behind this result are so evident that they need not be spelled out here in detail once again. It 
is essentially the case that if you reward people for doing nothing, you will obtain a lot of 
people doing nothing so they “qualify” for the reward.  
 
First of all it simply leads to a reduction in the search intensity of the unemployed and 
subsequently to a drop in their probability of being hired. In addition to that the wedge of 
taxes and insurance contributions that lies between the gross wage costs for firms and the net 
wage which workers receive broadens with the subsequent higher costs of the welfare state. 
The incentives shift towards non-employment and irregular employment. The inevitable 
consequence is a more aggressive wage bargaining behavior on the part of trade unions, 
which of course focus on the net wage that their members actually receive, with 
                                                 
4 See,e.g., Hunt (1995), Nickell (1997) and Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001).   15
corresponding employment losses. Another reason for this result is, however, that trade 
unions and firms know that excessive wage increases and rash dismissals entail less serious 
consequences for those workers who are made redundant as a result. After all they fall into a 
generously structured welfare-state net that guarantees them a considerable part of the net 
income they last earned. Due to unemployment assistance, this is actually the case in 
Germany for an unlimited time. Unions and employer associations can externalize substantial 
parts of their inappropriate wage setting behavior on society at large and on future generations 
in such an institutional environment. The generosity of the German welfare-state net thus 
induces a number of changes in behavior which are detrimental to employment, it causes so-
called “moral hazard” problems (table 5). 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
However, especially in Germany there have only been relatively minor changes in the 
generosity of the unemployment benefit system over time (Fehn, 1997). The system was 
already relatively generous in the heydays of the “Soziale Marktwirtschaft”. Most important is 
the substantial extension of the maximum benefit duration for older workers which took place 
in the mid 1980s. Workers aged 57 and older are now allowed to draw unemployment 
benefits for up to 32 months. This measure along with the introduction of relatively lax rules 
for early retirement were supposed to smooth the process of structural change and to facilitate 
the substitution of older by workers by young ones. The predictable result is a very low 
participation rate of workers aged between 55 and 65 which is a heavy burden for the social 
security system and which is unsustainable in view of the low fertility rate and of the 
shrinking population in Germany.  
 
Furthermore, it is not difficult to recognize why an overall relatively stable but generous 
system has become more damaging over the last thirty years. All of the above-described 
shocks cause people to be laid off against their will. Since a generous welfare-state net for the 
unemployed induces real wage rigidities to increase, more workers will be fired for a given 
size of any of these shocks. Furthermore, the resulting rise in unemployment will be longer 
lasting or possibly part of the rise will even be indefinite in such an institutional environment 
due to the reduced job finding rate of the unemployed. The outsider effect, which is the 
stronger the more generous is the welfare-state net for the unemployed, leads to persistence or 
even hysteresis of the unemployment rate and raises the particularly problematic long-term   16
unemployment rate. An especially striking case are industrial workers who are laid off due to 
this secular structural change described above and who have as a rule earned relatively high 
real wages due to high union strength and high capital intensity of production in the industrial 
sector. It becomes very unattractive for them to accept a job in the expanding, but in their 
qualification range low paying service sector if benefit and transfer payments are forever 
linked to their previous net wage. Yet, this is exactly the case in Germany because not only 
unemployment benefits but also unemployment assistance, which is paid without time limit, 
guarantees them more than fifty percent of the last previous net wage.   
 
From an employment perspective, Germany does badly in international comparisons with 
regard to the institutional setup of insurance and transfer payments to the unemployed. Above 
all, there is no individual choice whatsoever concerning the size and structure of the insurance 
package so that individual preferences and possible ability for self insurance are completely 
neglected thus ensuring that the system is inefficient. This inefficiency is reinforced by an 
almost 100% marginal tax rate in transition from receiving benefits to working on the regular 
labor market. Apart from some minor allowances every Euro earned on the regular labor 
market leads to an equivalent reduction in insurance or transfer payments to this person so 
that work incentives for low to medium qualified people are systematically destroyed. This is 
especially the case in view of the fact that jobs in this qualification range usually involve a 
substantial disutility of work in possible contrast to high qualified jobs and when considering 
that recipients of insurance and transfer payments have de facto no obligation to work.
5 The 
benefits are not only relatively high, but they are above all paid for a very long time, basically 
for an unlimited period, and the criteria which type of jobs an unemployed person is expected 
to accept are rather lax, with the result that the incentives to work are again weakened (figure 
12). These criteria were made slightly stricter during the last phase of the Kohl government, 
e.g., the maximum commuting time that can be expected from an unemployed, who is 
drawing benefits, for a working day of more than six hours was extended from 150 to 180 
minutes. The Schröder government, however, immediately cancelled this slight tightening of 
the criteria again and even abolished entirely the obligation to report regularly to the 
employment office.  
                                                 
5 This is de iure not the case for recipients of unemployment assistance or of social assistance whom the local 
communities are legally allowed to ask to do community work or to participate in qualification programs. In case 
of rejection or of simply not showing up, the community is allowed to cut payments or even to stop payments 
altogether in case of repeated non-compliance. However, up to now local communities appear to be relatively 
reluctant to use this instrument for controlling the actual willingness to work of recipients of transfer payments.    17
 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 
Even workers who are seeking full-time employment are still not expected to move to a 
different region of Germany regardless of how long they have been searching unsuccessfully 
for a new job in their region. It can therefore not come as a surprise that the mobility of 
German workers can only be described as low compared for example with that of their 
American colleagues which is especially problematic due to the high regional concentration 
of unemployment in Germany (Decressin and Fatas, 1994). What has also not yet been 
touched upon despite recent discussions is the duration of benefits for the unemployed. The 
payment of unemployment benefits, lasting for up to 32 months for older workers, is already 
very long by international comparison. But in Germany this is followed by the unlimited 
payment of unemployment assistance, which is also linked to the previous net wage even 
though unemployment assistance is entirely tax financed so that it is not part of the insurance 
package. It is therefore more than evident that the German system of insurance and transfer 
payments to the unemployed urgently needs to be reformed.  
 
1) Individual unemployment insurance accounts: There are two key elements for reducing 
the serious “moral hazard” problems associated with unemployment insurance. They are a far 
stronger emphasis on the actuarial principle of equivalence and on property rights in 
unemployment insurance. The radical measure - privatising unemployment insurance in order 
to achieve these aims - is, however, not implementable so easily. As long as the government 
guarantees a socio-cultural subsistence level, workers will not voluntarily insure themselves 
adequately against the risk of becoming unemployed. Since especially a country that is bound 
to the concept of the “social market economy” does not allow the individual to fall into a 
bottomless abyss, there is not enough personal interest in making voluntarily sufficient 
insurance provisions. Furthermore, it is also doubtful whether private unemployment 
insurances would have the necessary stability at all during macroeconomic disturbances. 
Unemployment constitutes a risk that is not insurable or only insurable with difficulty because 
the risks are highly correlated in the case of macroeconomic shocks. Private unemployment 
insurances are in danger of collapsing as long as they do not manage to pool the risk of 
unemployment with other risks which are statistically independent. It is not sufficient for 
private unemployment insurances to act internationally because macro-shocks such as oil 
price shocks or turbulences on financial markets often affect numerous countries   18
simultaneously and cyclical swings these days seem to be passed on between the highly 
developed industrial countries rather more markedly than they used to be. Finally, private 
insurers would also try to pursue a strategy of only insuring good risks, with the result that 
bad risks would have to pay prohibitively high contribution rates.  
 
Setting up of individual unemployment insurance accounts within the framework of the 
government-run unemployment insurance however constitutes a feasible step into the right 
direction. Employed workers could then stop paying contributions to the government-run 
unemployment insurance on a voluntary basis as soon as they have paid into this account at 
least the amount which is equal to the worker’s socio-cultural subsistence level multiplied by 
the duration of the unemployment benefits that he would be entitled to when becoming 
unemployed. After losing a job the worker should therefore not become a burden on social 
assistance during an otherwise existing entitlement to unemployment benefit. Whenever the 
balance on the unemployment insurance account were below this amount workers would have 
to pay contributions to the unemployment insurance. Workers would only have access to the 
account in the event of unemployment. If the balance of the account were positive at the time 
of retirement, the respective workers would be entitled to receiving this amount from the 
government plus interest. The interest rate could be based on, e.g., ten-year government 
bonds. The current state pseudo-insurance would therefore become an insurance with 
considerably reinforced property rights and a savings function.  
 
Such a construction would have the advantage that workers would fall back on their own 
money in the event of becoming unemployed, so that the aforementioned “moral hazard” 
problems would be reduced. The unemployed would look more intensively for a job because 
every additional day spent in unemployment would have to be paid out of their own pocket. 
Moreover, for the same reason trade unions with excessive wage demands and firms making 
rash redundancies would have to expect substantially more resistance from workers. Finally, 
administrative costs in labor offices would be saved because the voluntary search intensity of 
the unemployed would be raised by the improved incentive structures The supervision and 
spoon-feeding of all unemployed people which is necessary in today’s system could be 
stopped or at least substantially reduced for most of the unemployed.  
 
2) Structural reforms of the current unemployment insurance system: In addition to 
setting up individual unemployment insurance accounts, the maximum duration of receipt of   19
unemployment benefits should be substantially reduced, for instance to one year, so that 
entitlement to unemployment benefit ceases with the transition into long-term unemployment. 
Not only long benefit duration but also high replacement rates aggravate “moral hazard” 
problems. Here, too, the incentives should be set in such a way that unemployment and 
dismissals are avoided as far as possible without losing sight of the insurance aspect. A 
general waiting period of, e.g., two months after dismissal of workers by firms before 
unemployment benefits can be received would help in this respect. There is already a similar 
waiting period when workers quit voluntarily but do not immediately find a new job. In order 
to increase pressure to seriously look for a new job, unemployment benefits should, e.g., after 
six months of unemployment be gradually reduced to the level of social assistance, which 
should be reached after one year spent in unemployment.  
 
Furthermore, the criteria which kind of job offers an unemployed person can reject without 
losing benefits should be made more restrictive. It seems especially necessary given the high 
regional concentration of unemployment in Germany that unemployed persons looking for a 
full time job should become more mobile and should be prepared to move home after a 
certain duration of unemployment, for example after six months. The maximum commuting 
time should be increased again to 180 minutes. Furthermore, an unemployed person looking 
for a full time job should lose his entitlement to unemployment benefits after drawing it for, 
e.g., six months if he only turns down jobs offers because of the need to commute more than 
180 minutes per day to reach the place of work. Finally, German labor offices are still 
relatively lax in controlling whether the unemployed are actually searching intensively for a 
new job. This is reflected in the by international comparison low rate of labor offices in 
Germany interrupting the payment of benefits to the unemployed because they are not trying 
hard enough to obtain a new job (figure 13). Given that exit rates from unemployment are not 
higher in Germany than elsewhere it must be doubted that this low penalty rate in Germany is 
due to the German unemployed searching more intensively for a new job than their foreign 
counterparts.  
 
[Figure 13 about here] 
 
3) Abolition of unemployment assistance: The peculiarly German system of unemployment 
assistance is deeply flawed from the perspective of reintegrating the unemployed as quickly as 
possible into the regular labor market. It is not financed from insurance contributions, but it is   20
rather completely financed by the federal government. People are led to believe, however, that 
they have an entitlement to insurance since benefits are nonetheless linked to the last earned 
net income and since benefits are only being seven to ten percentage points below 
unemployment insurance depending on family status. In spite of a means test, it is therefore 
often the case that unemployment assistance substantially exceeds social assistance which 
should not be the case, though, because unemployment assistance is not part of the insurance 
package. Even more problematic is the additional factor that unemployment assistance is paid 
for an unlimited time thus promoting long-term unemployment. Considerung that local 
authorities should share with labor offices the responsibility for reintegrating the long-term 
unemployed into the regular labor market, it is in addition extremely problematic that 
unemployment assistance is financed out of the national tax coffers. The funding of the 
benefits and the responsibility for reintegration should be in the same hands in order to avoid 
distorted incentives. A high rate of success in the reintegration efforts must also be reflected 
in an immediate financial advantage for the relevant institution. To sum up, unemployment 
assistance should be abolished altogether. Anyone who has still not found a job when 
unemployment benefits expire after, e.g., one year of unemployment, is not an insurance case 
anymore but rather a social hardship case. Those affected should be made aware of this fact 
thus urging them to increase their job-search efforts. Of course, if they are needy, the people 
concerned should also receive social assistance like anyone else. 
 
4) Stronger work incentives for recipients of social assistance: If unemployment assistance 
is abolished and the maximum duration of unemployment benefits is reduced at the same 
time, then the question arises as to what should happen to the unemployed people who still 
have not found a new job even after their unemployment benefit entitlement has expired. First 
of all it is clear that in a “social market economy” needy people who are either unable to work 
or clearly willing to work but cannot find a job are then entitled to social assistance. But this 
results once again in “moral hazard” problems. Above all, unemployed people have the 
advantage over people in regular employment of having far more free time at their disposal 
creating in particular the opportunity to earn money in addition to social assistance on the 
black market. For some time now, the wage-gap principle for families in the lower income 
bracket is no longer fulfilled. Families in which only one parent is working in the lower 
income segment are only slightly better off financially than similar families which are 
financed by social assistance and in which nobody is working on a regular job. This is 
especially the case in the “Neue Länder” (figures 14 & 15).   21
 
[Figures 14 & 15 about here] 
 
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between two groups of people, those who are in 
principle able to work and those who are not, e.g., because they are handicapped or because 
they have to care for household members such as small children or elderly people. This latter 
group of people should continue to receive the current level of social assistance. In contrast, 
the standard rate of social assistance for long-term unemployed who are in principle able to 
work should be substantially cut to increase the incentive to work on the regular labor market, 
e.g., to 75% of the current level. In addition, an earned income tax credit system along the 
lines of the system in the US should then be put on top of this reduced social assistance level 
to even further strengthen work incentives and the incentive for unions to install a low wage 
sector.
6 The reduction of the standard rate of social assistance makes it possible to finance the 
earned income tax credit system. At current levels of social assistance, this would be 
infeasible. Hence, if a recipient of social assistance enters into a regular job, he would get a 
supplement from the government which first increases with his own earnings (phase in area) 
and is then, after a politically defined maximum of supplementary government money is 
reached, gradually reduced (phase out area). This would be a radically different approach 
from the current folly system in which apart from a minor allowance all money earned in 
addition to social assistance triggers a one to one reduction in social assistance payments. The 
current system completely destroys work incentives especially of the less qualified long-term 
unemployed people due to the hundred percent effective marginal tax rate in transition from 
receiving social assistance to working as a low qualified worker on the regular labor market.      
 
However, even under such a system with much strengthened work incentives not all recipients 
of social assistance who are able and willing to work will be able to find jobs on the regular 
labor market. To pay them only a substantially reduced social assistance level is bound to be 
considered unconstitutional in a “social market economy”, assuming that the current level of 
social assistance is indeed equivalent to the so-called “socio cultural subsistence level” at 
which recipients are just able to participate “adequately” in the life of society. Such recipients 
of social assistance should be offered job-creation and/or qualification measures by the 
particular local authorities in which they would earn the equivalent of the current level of 
                                                 
6 For a detailed description of a proposal along those lines, see Sinn et al. (2002).   22
social assistance for a full-time activity. This can by all means also be menial work such as 
cleaning streets and playgrounds or removing snow in wintertime from sidewalks since the 
disutility of work should not be smaller compared to a regular job. People participating in 
such measures organized by the local authorities should not be entitled to receiving 
unemployment benefits afterwards in order to avoid carousel effects. Hence, there would be a 
very strong incentive to accept a job in the regular labor market which would always lead to 
much higher effective earnings per hour worked compared to the programs offered by the 
local authorities due to the earned income tax credit system which is put on top of the 
reformed social assistance for regular work.  
 
Such a rigorous policy of give and take in the system of transfer payments to the long-term 
unemployed would have the advantage that it would substantially reduce the opportunity to 
exploit the welfare state and to work on the black market as a recipient of transfer payments 
thus increasing once again the general acceptance of supporting the needy in the public at 
large. Furthermore, this reform in the direction of workfare would reduce the problem that the 
way social assistance is currently arranged it constitutes an absolute lower limit for the net 
wage at which unemployed recipients of social assistance are prepared to accept a regular job 
and for collective wage agreements between unions and employer associations. This highly 
problematic threshold is a first-degree job killer on the regular labor market especially in the 
“Neue Länder” and with respect to families with several children and only one potential bread 
winner with below average qualification.  
 
 
b. Centralization of wage bargaining 
 
The new economy and also more competitive and globalized capital markets induce firms to 
specialize more on their core competencies. This greater specialization across firms stands in 
marked contrast to the shrinking degree of specialization of workers within firms. Hence, 
while it was still common two decades ago that firms diversified and workers specialized, 
almost the reverse is true nowadays. Multi-tasking and the breakdown of occupational barriers 
brought about by the new economy along with the accompanying organizational revolution 
amount to a reversal of a trend in which productivity improvements are achieved via an 
increased specialization of workers within firms. The beginning of this trend toward greater 
specialization within firms dates back as far as to the first industrial revolution and was   23
already described extensively by A. Smith in his seminal writings. However, this fundamental 
change in the organizational structure of firms has far-reaching consequences for the 
appropriateness of different wage-bargaining systems. In a nutshell, centralized systems of 
wage bargaining, which cede relatively little room to firms for maneuvering with respect to 
wages in order to mitigate incentive and efficiency wage problems, are becoming more and 
more inefficient. They prevent firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to 
perform the appropriate mix of tasks, thus reducing their profit opportunities and investment 
incentives. Allowing much greater wage drift is not a solution as this undermines the system 
and is therefore not acceptable to central wage setters (Lindbeck and Snower, 1997). 
 
Centralized wage bargaining has for a long time been praised by many economists as a system 
which allows the internalization of various externalities, in particular with respect to 
inflationary pressures and with respect to unemployment insurance.
7 It is the core principle of 
any system of centralized wage bargaining that the same wage should be paid for the same job 
irrespective of the individual economic situation of the firm in which the job is performed. 
This hallmark of centralized wage bargaining, “equal pay for equal work”, crucially depends 
on workers with similar educational background, experience and profiles having similar 
productivities even if they perform different tasks. There even exist two efficiency arguments 
in its favor. It supposedly helps profitable firms to grow faster and destroys more quickly 
firms whose efficiency is below average thus possibly promoting structural change in case 
workers are highly mobile. Furthermore, the possibilities for inefficient rent sharing on the 
firm level due to insiders holding up firms are reduced by centralized wage bargaining 
systems.  
 
However, workers especially in Germany are not so mobile. In addition, the more 
heterogeneous a country is, the more problematic is this principle of “equal pay for equal 
work” because seemingly similar workers are then more likely to make very different 
contributions to the output of their respective firms, e.g., due to different production methods, 
capital intensities or level of infrastructure in their respective regions. This is especially the 
case in Germany since reunification, which made Germany much more heterogeneous and no 
longer comparable at all to countries like the Netherlands or Sweden. Germany has become a 
little bit more like the US, i.e., a large country with very different levels of regional economic 
                                                 
7 See Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Calmfors (1993).   24
development. Yet hardly anybody would ever suggest that a system of centralized wage 
bargaining would be beneficial for a country as heterogeneous as the US. The folly policy of 
rapid wage equalization, which by far outpaced the catch up of labor productivity in the 
“Neue Länder”, necessarily had disastrous consequences for labor market performance first of 
all in the “Neue Länder, but via higher social security contributions and taxes to finance the 
rising pool of unemployed in the “Neue Länder” eventually also in the “Alte Länder”.   
 
Several countries decentralized their systems of wage bargaining during the 1980s and 
1990s.
8 The new economy with its organizational revolution and the accompanying move 
from Fordism to post-Fordism provides a powerful economic rationale for this international 
pattern of institutional change. Central wage setters have little choice but to set wages 
schematically and to fix one wage or a narrow range of wages for every broadly defined 
group of tasks. However, the new economy and multi-tasking make this practice inherently 
inefficient, since the productivity of a particular worker depends even less than in former 
times only on his formal qualification for this one task but also on the other tasks which he is 
performing and, in addition, to a great extent on his soft skills. Workers, even if they have 
similar formal profiles, are unlikely to perform the same set of complementary tasks at 
different holistic firms. Overall productivity of such seemingly similar workers along with 
their incentive problems must be expected to differ across firms in a post-Fordist 
environment.
9 Since people within any particular education, occupation and job tenure group 
are likely to vary considerably in terms of their social competence, cognitive skills, judgment 
and ability to perform multiple tasks, wage dispersion even among people with similar formal 
qualifications needs to increase with the new economy and the accompanying IT and 
organizational revolution.  
 
To give a simple example, if wages are set on the central level according to the productivity 
of versatile workers who can make great use of task complementarities, workers who are not 
able to do so are likely to end up being unemployed. Hence, centralized wage bargaining 
systems impose a growing efficiency cost on OECD countries by artificially compressing the 
wage distribution (Davis and Henrekson, 2000). Allowing greater wage drift is not a 
sustainable solution because this would slowly undermine the operability of the central wage-
bargaining system. The new economy along with skill-biased technological progress improve 
                                                 
8 See Freeman and Gibbons (1993) and Berthold and Fehn (1996). 
9 See Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1993) and Lindbeck and Snower (1997).   25
the outside option of workers with the skills demanded by firms, thus reducing their incentive 
to stay within a union or to join a union in the first place. The result is the observable decline 
of union membership across OECD countries, which is the basis for any centralized wage 
bargaining system, and in the end a greater wage differentiation (Acemoglu, Aghion and 
Violante, 2001).  
 
Labor is becoming more heterogeneous with the new economy and the ongoing process of 
rapid structural change. It is even less than in the past a single-purpose unit which is easily 
comparable across firms according to formal qualification, profile and seniority. The 
organizational revolution is furthermore likely to trigger a sharp increase in the number of 
occupational clusters relative to the traditional number of occupational categories. This makes 
it even more difficult than in the past for centralized wage bargaining parties to establish 
broad occupational categories within which wage uniformity could be imposed without great 
efficiency losses. In addition, the dissolution of functional departments in favor of small 
customer-oriented teams and in favor of profit centers, which produce highly differentiated 
products, is also increasing the heterogeneity of task clusters across firms, thus further 
complicating life for central wage bargaining parties.  
 
It is hardly conceivable that the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, which is the hallmark 
of any centralized wage bargaining system, could be amended by redefining work along 
holistic lines. The dramatic rise in the heterogeneity of workers’ skills which matter, of tasks 
and of task complementarities even within a particular industry would require that central 
wage bargaining parties dispose over vast amounts of information which is furthermore very 
quickly obsolete. This up to date information conglomerate is just as unlikely to be available 
to central wage bargaining parties as full information about production technologies, customer 
demands etc. was to traditional communist central planners. Labor markets are becoming 
more like product markets with respect to heterogeneity. In short, asymmetric information 
problems between firms and workers on the one hand and centralized wage bargaining parties 
on the other hand have risen thus reducing the optimal degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining.  
 
It seems reasonable to conjecture that the international trend over the last two decades toward 
more decentralized wage bargaining, e. g., in the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Scandinavian countries or Italy, is at least partly related to this set of reasons, because the   26
described efficiency costs in the end amount to foregone opportunities for GNP and 
employment growth (Lindbeck and Snower, 1997). This assessment fits with the observation 
that new economy firms and in fact small firms in general do usually not join employer 
associations and centralized wage bargaining arrangements and often even offer remuneration 
packages to their employees which contain profit sharing components and/or stock options of 
their firms in order to mitigate the growing incentive and efficiency wage problems. Such 
remuneration packages have great advantages for new economy firms. First, wage pressure is 
reduced and payroll costs become more flexible. Second, they foster more decentralized 
decision making and make it easier to split firms up into profit centers. Hence, from this 
perspective the new economy promotes the creation of a share economy thus blurring the 
historic division between capital and labor (Freeman, 2000).  
 
Germany lags behind in the international trend toward more decentralized wage bargaining 
which boils down to some kind of profit sharing even without explicitly linking wages to 
profits of their firms. This is the case because wages negotiated at the firm level always also 
depend on the profitability of the specific firm. The slow pace of institutional change 
especially in Germany in this respect is all the more surprising because of the aforementioned 
fact that reunification raised the efficiency costs of a relatively centralized wage bargaining 
system in particular in this country thus making structural reforms in favor of more 
decentralized wage setting even more urgent than in other OECD countries. Reform resistance 
by entrenched interest groups therefore appears to be especially high in Germany. However, it 
is well known that a sizable number of firms in the German “Neue Länder“ do not pay 
according to industry-wide wage agreements even though they belong to the employers’ 
association, but this kind of behavior is clearly illegal and only continues because such firms 
have not yet been sued in court. Nonetheless, in the end the gulf between official centralized 
wage agreements and economic reality in the “Neue Länder“ might help to break apart the 
bargaining cartel, which was unfortunately imposed by the “Alte Länder” on the “Neue 
Länder“ after reunification.  
 
If unions, employer associations and the government would like to avoid an uncontrolled 
collapse of the current institutional setting, it is advisable to preemptively make centralized 
wage agreements more flexible and to cede greater decision-making power to the firm level. 
Most important, wage negotiations and agreements on the firm level, e.g. between 
management and works councils, should in contrast to the current legal situation be legalized   27
and in fact be given priority if a qualified majority of the firm’s workers like 75% agrees to 
differ from the central wage agreement. In case wage negotiations on the firm level fail, the 
central wage agreement could continue to serve as the fall back position. It should 
furthermore be clarified in the respective labor laws that wage concessions on the firm level 
relative to the centralized bargaining agreement can be beneficial to workers if jobs are 
thereby preserved. The current prevailing legal interpretation states that only higher wages 
can be better for workers thus completely neglecting the fact that there is a trade-off between 
the real cost of labor and the number of jobs. Finally, the legal possibility for the government 
to declare sectoral wage agreements between unions and employer associations as generally 
binding for all firms of an industry, even those which do not belong to the particular 
employers’ association like in the construction sector, should be abolished once and for all 
since it violates fundamental principles of a market economy and since it destroys rather than 
creates jobs (Berthold and Fehn, 2002). 
 
If these urgent steps turn out to be politically infeasible right away, there are some inferior 
alternatives which are more in line with the current system. First, central wage agreements 
should only fix a corridor for wage changes within in the industry with the specific number to 
be determined on the firm level. Second, central wage agreements should contain a provision 
that part of the fixed wage change is allowed to be substituted by a profit sharing component 
by mutual consent on the firm level. Third, central wage agreements should always contain 
special wage clauses for disadvantaged groups of the labor market like the long-term 
unemployed or elderly workers. In sum, all institutional arrangements and legal barriers in 
Germany which obstruct the path toward greater wage flexibility and wage differentiation 
according to local conditions should be put under very close scrutiny, since they are highly 
likely to contribute to the malaise on the German labor market especially under the conditions 
of the new economy and due to the changes brought about by reunification.  
 
 
c. Employment protection legislation 
 
Another important and controversial labor market institution which differs greatly across 
OECD countries is firing costs or employment protection legislation (EPL). EPL is in general 
considerably more restrictive in continental European countries than in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (table 6). In particular the US with its “employment at will” principle is usually   28
ranked very low concerning firing costs. Within continental Europe, firing costs tend to be 
higher in Southern European countries compared to Northern European countries. Northern 
European countries usually protect workers against negative shocks rather via relatively 
generous unemployment insurance and welfare assistance (Buti et al., 1998). Firing costs 
increased substantially in some continental European countries like Germany and France in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s and have roughly stayed on this higher level since then 
(Caballero and Hammour, 1997). It was one of the first measures of the Red-Green 
government in 1998, though, to extend the scope which firms are affected by EPL, i.e., that 
such legal restrictions already apply again to small firms with only five or more employees. 
The Kohl government had just raised this threshold to firms with ten employees or more 
during its last term.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
It is not obvious how EPL affects overall labor market performance because there are 
opposing effects at work. There exist several arguments why some EPL might be superior to 
the free market solution with no government-imposed EPL not only for reasons of equity but 
also on efficiency grounds (Bentilola and Bertola, 1990). First, EPL in the form of severance 
payments forces firms to internalize some of the costs which they impose on workers who are 
dismissed and on society at large. Second, EPL smoothes employment over the business cycle 
because firms will then be more reluctant to fire workers in recessions as this would make 
them incur firing costs which they might avoid by simply hoarding workers over the 
downturn. Third, EPL protects workers against arbitrary dismissals by firms thus possibly 
creating a more trustful working relationship between firms and workers and making workers 
more willing to invest themselves into firm-specific human capital.  
 
It can be argued on these grounds that continental European firms are specialized on activities 
which require long-term relationships between firms and their workers, trust and a lot of firm-
specific human capital whereas US firms specialize on activities which basically require no 
human capital at all like hamburger flipping or on activities which require a high level of 
general human capital like software development or auditing/consulting. However, in such a 
case a more volatile economic environment along with faster structural change constitutes a 
greater problem for continental European countries. More jobs along with the employees’ 
firm-specific human capital and rent-sharing component are destroyed and the resistance of   29
workers against such dismissals can accordingly be expected to be fiercer in continental 
Europe as their outside options are worse. Whether or not German workers along with their 
continental European counterparts command over greater firm-specific human capital is in the 
end an empirical question. The empirical literature confirms the interpretation that firm-
specific human capital plays a greater role in continental Europe with the associated problems 
under the current turbulent economic conditions (Wasmer, 2002).    
  
Independent of economic conditions, there exist a couple of fundamental arguments which 
caution against raising EPL too much. First, EPL increases total labor costs thus reducing 
labor demand at given wage costs. It is sometimes argued that EPL is viewed as insurance 
against adverse shocks by workers and that wages will therefore fall in reaction to higher EPL 
as workers are willing to pay an insurance premium. However, this argument is not 
convincing in the context of EPL which is imposed by the government and not the result of 
negotiations between workers and their respective firm. In the latter case, a package deal 
might be struck between workers and firms explicitly involving lower wages in return for 
higher employment protection ceded by firms, e.g., in the form of severance payments. Once 
they are employed and insiders, workers have no reason whatsoever, though, to make such 
wage concessions if the government raises their bargaining power unilaterally via imposing 
higher EPL on firms. On the contrary, it must be expected that their wage demands will 
become more aggressive once they are hired and enjoy protection via EPL because their 
potential to appropriate firms after having been hired is raised (Caballero and Hammour, 
1997). Insiders will not be dismissed by firms as long as wages do not exceed their marginal 
productivity plus firing costs (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). The negative effect on labor 
market performance is the greater, the larger is the long run elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor. Recent empirical evidence pointing to a long run elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor which exceeds the threshold value of one suggests that the negative 
effects in the long run of expanding EPL are considerably larger than hitherto assumed 
(Berthold, Fehn and Thode, 2002).  
 
Second, EPL makes firms more reluctant to hire workers at given wage costs. Labor market 
flows in and out of unemployment are unambiguously reduced by EPL. While there is in 
theory no clear-cut effect on total unemployment from lower labor market flows, the reduced 
hiring rate due to EPL makes unemployment more persistent and raises long-term 
unemployment, which is especially problematic not only from an economic but also from a   30
political point of view. Hence, once dismissed it is more difficult for workers in countries 
with high EPL to obtain a regular job compared to a laissez-faire country such as the US. EPL 
therefore increases the segmentation of the labor market into insiders and outsiders.
10   
 
In addition to these general arguments against EPL, which apply irrespective from economic 
conditions, the above-described transition to the new economy makes it likely that countries 
with relatively low EPL fare better nowadays with respect to labor market performance. EPL 
is especially bad for employment when big structural breaks occur such as is the case with the 
new economy because firms are then very reluctant to hire new workers while EPL cannot 
prevent dismissals in firms or sectors which are going down the drain anyway. Furthermore, 
economic conditions have become more volatile over the last about 15 years due to 
globalization and the transition to the new economy with shocks occurring more frequently 
and with shocks also being greater in size. However, such a development toward a less stable 
economic environment is not innocuous with respect to the effects of EPL on labor market 
performance. The negative effect of EPL on labor demand is greater in a volatile than in a 
tranquil economic environment and is especially harmful to firms which are largely financed 
via debt rather than via equity because labor becomes a quasi-fixed production factor with 
which firms cannot quickly adjust to changing economic conditions. Thus, quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment is raised if unions do not exercise sufficient wage restraint in return.
11  
 
There are four additional arguments why EPL might be especially problematic in the context 
of the new economy. First, it can be shown that firms in high-EPL countries are induced to 
specialize on relatively secure goods at later stages in their product life cycles in order to 
avoid paying firing costs (Saint-Paul, 2002a). New and innovative goods with a high failure 
risk but which are essential for the transition to the new economy are first developed and 
produced in low-EPL countries such as the US and only move later on to high-EPL countries, 
such as Germany, which will then tend to refine their production via process innovations. Via 
this negative effect on innovative activity in a country like Germany, strict EPL reduces 
opportunities for GDP and employment growth and induces excessive growth of the capital 
intensity of production (figure 16).   
 
[Figure 16 about here] 
                                                 
10 See Lindbeck and Snower (2002) and Saint-Paul (2002b). 
11 See Bertola and Ichino (1995) and Fehn (2002).   31
 
Second, this negative effect of EPL on innovation and growth is reinforced by the fact that 
growth based on radical product innovations depends less on having experienced workers and 
managers but rather much more on selecting the right group of innovative people and on 
being able to lay off people without much hassle who have turned out to be incompetent. The 
importance of selection relative to experience rises when moving to the frontier of economic 
development thus making rigid EPL less efficient (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002). 
 
Third, large-scale creation of new firms has been a hallmark of the new economy in the US. 
However, newly founded firms often face financial restrictions and a high rate of new firms 
per period depends on a well-functioning venture capital market in order to circumvent as 
much as possible such financial restrictions. Venture capitalists in the form of business angels 
also often help their portfolio firms to survive the especially risky start-up period by 
counseling and advising them. Empirical studies show, though, that the growth of the venture 
capital market, which clearly helps a country to be a successful player in the new economy, 
depends greatly on labor market flexibility, so that countries with a rigid labor market due to 
high EPL have from this perspective a lower chance of benefiting from a positive new 
economy effect than countries with low EPL and a more flexible labor market.
12  
 
Fourth, lower firing costs would also fit well with the above-described desideratum of a more 
decentralized system of wage bargaining in the new economy and after reunification. It would 
help to prevent locally negotiated wages to be greatly affected by insider-outsider and rent-
seeking considerations which is bound to occur if EPL is very strict and wages are negotiated 
on the firm level. Insider wage negotiating power on the firm level is strongly affected by 
EPL. Firm-level wage bargaining is therefore much more beneficial for employment growth if 
EPL is low to avoid rent appropriation by insiders as much as possible.  
 
Considering though that there are countervailing effects of EPL on labor market performance, 
the direction and size of the net impact on the unemployment rate and, less so, on 
employment growth is after all an empirical question. There exist by now numerous cross-
country studies concerning the effect of labor market institutions on unemployment.
13 EPL is 
often found to have an insignificant effect on the unemployment rate, and if the effect is 
                                                 
12 See Jeng and Wells (2000) and Fehn (2002). 
13 See e.g. Nickell (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (1999).    32
significant, it usually raises the unemployment rate but with a rather small impact coefficient. 
Yet, most of these studies suffer three important shortcomings. First, the time period which is 
investigated often only extends up to the early 1990s so that most of the 1990s when the 
transition to new economy got under way is left out.
14 If the new economy matters, this 
restriction concerning the time period under investigation tends to bias the results in favor of 
EPL. Second, they either include only institutional variables concerning the labor market or 
supplement them merely with goods market variables. Capital market variables are as a rule 
completely left out. This might be an important shortcoming because it is reasonable to 
assume that a well-functioning capital market, especially concerning venture capital, has 
become more important for labor market performance with the new economy. If these 
shortcomings are amended with the time period under consideration extending from 1986 to 
1999 and with labor, goods and capital market variables included as explanatory variables, 
EPL does turn out to have a significant negative effect on labor market performance across 
OECD countries, raising the standardized unemployment rate and lowering employment 
growth with the negative effect on employment growth of EPL being more pronounced than 
the positive impact on the unemployment rate (Belke and Fehn, 2001).  
 
In sum, lowering EPL would help to fight unemployment and to raise employment in the age 
of the new economy by facilitating hiring decisions of firms. Conversely, the policy of the 
current German government with respect to EPL must be regarded as deeply flawed if 
lowering unemployment is indeed one of the key policy objectives. Extending EPL also to 
small firms and restricting the possibilities for fixed-term labor contracts does not match with 
the requirements of the new economy. From the perspective of achieving employment 
growth, it would be best to completely substitute current EPL by a legal financial solution 
which is clear-cut and unambiguous. Firms, which need to lay off workers due to firm-
specific reasons and not due to, say, misconduct of workers, would then be legally obliged to 
make severance payments to these workers, which would be linked concerning their size to 
the annual salary and tenure in the firm of the individual worker. Such a stratification and 
simplification of EPL would have the great advantage to create certainty with respect to the 
legal consequences of lay offs and to substantially reduce the role of labor courts which are 
notorious in Germany for their foot-dragging and for not considering the consequences of 
                                                 
14 Chen, Snower and Zoega (2002) find that the empirical effect of firing costs depends on the time period under 
investigation because firing costs do have especially adverse employment effects in periods of economic 
instability with many negative shocks and low growth rates.    33
their jurisdiction for the economy at large as well as for employment creation. It would end 
the unfortunate current situation in Germany in which firms are now in fact playing a lottery 
with the court system (Heckman, 2002). 
 
If such a radical solution concerning EPL turns out to be not immediately politically feasible 
due to heavy resistance by insiders and unions, it should at least be introduced for future 
hirings by firms and it should be much more clearly stated in the law when dismissals by 
firms are legal so that labor courts have less discretion in their rulings on disputes between 
firms and laid-off workers. The current insecure legal situation and the tendency of labor 
courts to interpret unclear cases in favor of workers greatly reduces the willingness of firms to 
hire new workers and to found firms in the first place in Germany.  
 
 
IV. Moving from Investment- to Innovation-Based Growth 
 
There is a widespread presumption that unemployment must be due to labor market rigidities 
and a generous welfare state. This is obviously not the case, though, in Keynesian type 
situations where unemployment is due to a lack of goods demand. Yet, structural 
unemployment of the continental European type may also not be solely due to labor market 
rigidities and a generous welfare state (Solow, 2000). It is straightforward to show within the 
standard labor market model for determining the quasi-equilibrium unemployment rate that 
structural unemployment rises in the long run with higher entry barriers for new firms. Such 
higher entry barriers for new firms lower the equilibrium number of firms, the elasticity of 
product demand for each incumbent firm along with its output and thus raise the markup of 
incumbent firms on production costs. Monopoly rents are higher thus inducing more 
aggressive wage negotiation behavior by insiders who seek to acquire part of the rents. All 
effects taken together result in an unambiguously higher quasi-equilibrium rate of 
unemployment (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2001).  
 
Labor market rigidities and an ill-designed welfare state play of course an important role 
especially in Germany in explaining the ongoing malaise on the labor market as has been 
pointed out in the previous section. However, it is crucial to recognize that Germany is in fact 
stuck in a web of rigidities which essentially involves all markets. Institutions are designed in   34
such a way that not only insiders on the labor market are privileged, but incumbents are given 
substantial legal prerogatives essentially on all markets including in particular the product and 
the capital market. The housing market is another leading example which stifles the mobility 
of workers due to its substantial prerogatives for incumbents. Competition by outsiders is 
systematically thwarted across markets by law and by non-legal institutional settings in order 
to induce “stability” and “long-term relationships”. This might have been a successful 
institutional setting in the past when Germany was behind in terms of economic development 
and could therefore count on catch-up growth and the adoption of technologies which were 
invented by countries at the frontier of economic development such as the US. However, this 
strategy of “investment-based growth” reached its limits some time ago and the post-war 
period with little importance of investing into R&D, of orchestrating radical product 
innovations and of being among the leading countries in moving to new sectors is basically 
finished for Germany. In order to be successful in the future, Germany just like Japan has to 
adapt its institutional setting in such a way that the switch to “innovation-based growth” is 
made possible (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002). This involves much more 
competition, i.e., lower entry barriers for outsiders on all markets, greater selectivity of 
managers, more risk taking, greater failure rates of firms, more mobility, less government 
involvement in market activities, less invidivual income stability over time and greater 
income differentiation between individuals. Hence, nothing less than a cultural revolution is 
called for in Germany. Resistance by entrenched insiders on all markets, who have benefited 
from the anti-competitive institutional setting in the past and are therefore well-positioned to 
fight for their privileges, is bound to be fierce. The futile efforts of economists in Germany 
over at least the last decade to push its political leaders in the direction of bold structural 
reforms underscores this sobering assessment. It is a precondition for future economic 
success, though, that Germany finally gets rid of its corporatist deal-making between union 
leaders, managers of large companies and the government in smoke-filled back rooms in 
favor of transparency, competition and innovation.      
 
This is an era of creative destruction and of massive structural change in which the traditional 
German policy approach of trying as much as possible to preserve the status quo and of 
maintaining special privileges for incumbents on the labor, the goods and the capital market is 
no longer sustainable. The opportunity costs in terms of foregone GDP and employment 
growth of such an obsolete policy have risen dramatically. It results in an insufficient rate of 
job creation thus inevitably raising unemployment over time. Lowering the rate of job   35
destruction via policy measures such as targeted subsidies to declining sectors or labor market 
rigidities such as employment protection legislation is a self-defeating and non-sustainable 
policy approach as can be seen once again in the German case. Now even more than in the 
past, the institutional framework on all markets must be such that the creation of new firms 
and the development of innovative products is fostered in order to achieve job growth that is 
not entirely limited to low wage jobs. The overall institutional framework must enable the 
German economy to adapt to change and to exploit as much as possible the opportunities and 
to meet the challenges provided by the ongoing transition to the new economy. Hence, entry 
by outsiders on all markets must be promoted and not hindered so that new ideas, innovation 
and competition are fostered.  
 
The barriers to business formation are high in Germany by international comparison so that 
the entry of new firms into the product market is impeded rather than promoted, e.g., via 
relatively high start-up costs and a tedious bureaucracy with which potential founders of new 
firms have to cope (table 7). Hence, incumbent firms are relatively well protected against the 
start up of potential competitors thus raising their monopoly power and reducing quantities 
concerning output and employment. Overall product market regulation is considerably higher 
than in the Anglo-Saxon countries but lower than, e.g., in France and Italy (Figure 17).  
 
[Table 7 and Figure 17 about here] 
 
High product market regulation, low legal protection of providers of risk-bearing capital 
against ex-post appropriation by management and highly regulated labor markets go hand in 
hand across countries (figures 18 & 19). Countries tend to cluster into groups which either 
covet flexibility and level playing field for newcomers on all three markets - labor, capital and 
goods markets - (especially the US and the UK) or prefer to give special protection to 
incumbents also on all three markets (Germany, France and Italy). It is important to keep in 
mind in this context that inducing competition on the product market, e.g., via low regulatory 
barriers for entry on the product market and via a booming venture capital market is an 
important way of curbing excessive union power on the labor market. The larger are the 
monopoly rents on the product market due to entry barriers for new firms, the greater is the 
incentive for unions and workers to engage in rent-seeking activities and to lobby, e.g., for 
higher employment protection legislation. Hence, a vicious circle is set in motion. Lack of 
competition on the product market reduces labor demand and induces aggressive union wage   36
bargaining due to monopoly rents, which incumbent firms earn. All this results in higher wage 
pressure so that labor market performance is negatively affected from both sides of the 
market. In order to escape this vicious circle and to set instead in motion a virtuous circle of 
more innovative activity as well as higher GDP and employment growth, it is necessary to 
implement comprehensive and complementary structural reforms lowering entry barriers in 
favor of competition by outsiders on the labor, the product and last but not least the capital 
market (Koeniger, 2002).   
 
[Figures 18 & 19 about here] 
 
It is important to keep in mind in this context that the institutional structure of capital markets 
varies considerably between Anglo-Saxon countries such as the U.S. and the UK and 
continental European countries such as Germany (table 8). While the stock market along with 
a booming venture capital market play a central role in the former countries among other 
things due to an elaborate legal protection of shareholders against expropriation by 
management, the latter countries can be crudely characterized as being bank based (Edwards 
and Fischer, 1994). Firms in Germany still rely to a much larger degree on debt financing via 
banks and there are still extensive cross shareholdings between banks and especially large 
firms.
15 This and proxy voting causes control of firms to rest largely with banks rather than 
with the public as shareholders at large or institutional investors such as pension funds. The 
capitalization of the stock market relative to GDP and the size of the venture capital market is 
much lower compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. Hence, firms in Anglo-Saxon countries 
enjoy considerably better access to risk-bearing capital. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
While this has been the common way of grouping institutional structures on capital markets 
for quite some time, recent research has shown that another fruitful, but after all related 
approach consists in distinguishing countries according to the degree to which laws and their 
enforcement effectively protect the providers of equity and debt capital from ex-post 
appropriation by firms, i.e., by management and workers.
16 Four groups of countries emerge 
                                                 
15 This might change in particular in Germany with the tax reform that has just been passed allowing corporate 
firms to sell stakes in other firms without paying capital gains taxes anymore.  
16 See La Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (1999a), and (1999b).   37
according to their legal heritage: French, Scandinavian and German civil law countries and 
the Anglo-Saxon common law countries. It is important to note that such countries as Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan are grouped among the German civil law countries. Generally, 
Anglo-Saxon common law countries provide the best effective protection of financiers with 
the notable exception that countries where the legislation on capital markets stems from 
German civil law display the strictest protection of creditors. Hence, Anglo-saxon countries 
have institutional structures for financing firms which are superior in both respects compared 
to French and Scandinavian countries, but compared to German countries they tend to have a 
comparative institutional advantage only in equity and venture capital financing and not in 
debt financing where the reverse holds (Carlin and Mayer, 1999).   
 
The real effects of such differences in the institutional setting on capital markets in particular 
with respect to the situation on the labor market have just recently started to receive closer 
attention in the literature. It is a crucial point when comparing the Anglo-Saxon with the 
German law countries to recognize that the economic environment has fundamentally 
changed over the last twenty years. Not only have the German law countries essentially 
finished the catch-up process after the war by the end of the 1970s, but all highly developed 
countries have entered into another phase of radical structural change, which can in a stylized 
form be described as moving away from the industrial sector toward the service sector and 
toward the information-technology sector. In particular the manufacturing of largely 
standardized industrial goods, where fixed capital investment and economies of scale play a 
large role (“investment-based growth”), is rapidly becoming an outdated mode of production 
in highly developed countries.  
 
Their relatively sophisticated protection of creditors gives German law countries a 
comparative institutional advantage in debt financing which is reflected in close and long-
lasting bank-firm relationships. Such an institutional setup appears to be advantageous mainly 
in stable times where countries are moving along a more or less already known technological 
trajectory and where the aggregate level of investment into fixed capital is crucial for the 
overall performance of the economy. Past profits are then a relatively good indicator for 
future success so that the information problem which firms should receive financing is less 
difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, fixed capital can very well serve as collateral, which is 
important for debt-financing. German law countries such as Germany itself or Japan, which   38
have an edge in protecting creditors and where there are strong ties between banks and large 
firms, therefore display comparatively high rates of fixed capital investment.  
 
Fixed capital investment was an important component of employment growth in the catch-up 
phase after the war when radical innovations by the leading industrial nations could be 
mimicked and when insiders on the labor market were not as well entrenched yet. But the 
more a country moves to the frontier of economic development, the less investment into fixed 
capital fosters employment growth. This fits with the observation that countries such as 
Germany and Japan have benefited from their capital market institutions during the post-war 
period, but that this has become doubtful during the last decade (Carlin and Mayer, 1999).      
 
While such a capital market structure might have been appropriate in the first half of the post-
war period, it is hardly optimal for the current period of rapid structural change, where 
especially the correlation between past profits and future investment opportunities is lower. A 
key problem in financing structural change nowadays is how to get free cash flows out of 
large established firms with few profitable investment projects to new, liquidity-constrained 
entrepreneurs with promising ideas for investment projects in fledgling sectors, where the 
chances to achieve lasting employment growth are greatest. A strong bargaining position of 
shareholders vis-à-vis management like in Anglo-Saxon countries helps because it forces 
management in the large public firms to pay out a larger fraction of free cash flows, which 




Key aspects for achieving employment growth in highly developed countries and thus in later 
stages of economic development are the ability to achieve a first-mover advantage in the 
transition to new sectors and to finance structural change by funding R&D, by orchestrating 
radical product innovations and by establishing new firms (“innovation-based growth”).
18 
This is in particular true if employment growth is not to take place only in the form of low-
paid service sector jobs where labor market rigidities, generous welfare states and, more 
fundamentally, deeply rooted equity considerations of society at large are the key obstacles. 
Incremental or process innovations in industries where the main technological breakthroughs 
essentially occurred either at the end of the 19
th century or during the first half of the 20
th 
                                                 
17 See Hubbard (1998) and Fehn (2002). 
18 See Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) and Carlin and Mayer (1999).   39
century are hardly avenues for achieving major employment gains anymore. Rather, 
employment growth largely takes place in the service sector or in the production of new and 
niche products which are often technologically advanced. An important source of 
employment growth in the 1990s have also been investments into information technology. 
However, similar to the service sector, investments into information technology largely 
produce intangible assets so that countries which have trouble in adequately financing such 
high-risk ventures by means of equity or venture capital have an inherent disadvantage in 
obtaining employment growth in the thriving service and information-technology sectors 
compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. Empirical evidence indicates that the use of debt 
financing depends positively on asset tangibility (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). A large stream 
of new firms entering the product market each period facilitates structural change, so that 
countries which provide an institutional environment which is conducive to the creation of 




The failure rates among such projects as R&D, radical product innovations, and new firms is 
generally high while the few successful ones are likely to produce large profits. A thriving 
entrepreneurial activity in these high-risk areas therefore depends on the one hand on society 
at large and on the tax system in particular accepting substantial income differentiation. Both 
aspects are lacking in Germany due to the high emphasis on egalitarianism and income 
compression which stifle entrepreneurial risk taking. It depends on the other hand also on the 
existence of a particular capital market structure. First, the institutional structure on the capital 
market must handle well problems of asymmetric information. Second, it must foster the 
funding of highly risky projects without much collateral. Third, as it is uncertain which 
projects will be successful, it must be able to sort out and provide financing to a large number 
of projects, and there must also be the possibility to abandon projects quickly once their 
failure becomes apparent. Fourth, the capital market must provide a suitable environment for 
financiers to convert successful projects into cash for themselves, e.g. by going public. It must 
help to prevent workers and management from breaching the ex-ante agreed upon terms of 
trade by reducing ex post payments to financiers.  
 
                                                 
19 See Guiso (1997), Harhoff (1997) and Weigand and Audretsch (1999).   40
These conditions are arguably more likely to be fulfilled on Anglo-Saxon type stock-market 
based capital markets with in particular a thriving venture-capital market and with an 
elaborate effective legal protection of shareholders and venture capitalists than on German 
law capital markets.
20 In particular, venture capitalists participate fully in the profits of 
successful projects so that they are more willing than creditors to finance highly risky 
projects. In addition, venture capitalists are especially able to reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information due to their active engagement in the process of actually carrying out 
projects and due their expertise in monitoring firms in the sector concerned. Furthermore, the 
number of projects that are initially financed is larger when there is a well-developed venture 
capital market. Recent empirical studies show that there is a positive relationship between 
innovation activity, founding of new firms and in the end labor market performance on the 




[Table 9 about here] 
 
Thus, lowering entry barriers and raising the possibilities of competition by outsiders via 
fundamental, comprehensive and complementary structural reforms in Germany of the 
institutional setup on the labor, the goods and the capital market is crucial for achieving a 
sustainable and significant improvement of labor market performance. Piece-meal reforms of 
changing something here and there once in a while when the political climate happens to be 
favorable will not work. The overall intensity of market regulation needs to be cut back in 
order to achieve higher employment growth (figure 20).  
 




Only an encompassing and bold set of institutional reforms including not only the labor 
market, but also the goods and the capital market can enable Germany to overcome its 
persistent unemployment problem and to meet successfully the challenges posed by the onset 
of the new economy. Such a broad package of structural reforms is the only way for Germany 
                                                 
20 See Black and Gilson (1998) and Hellmann and Puri (1999).   41
to get rid of its current position as being among the most sclerotic European countries which 
is reflected in its dismal record concerning especially economic and employment growth. 
However, complacency and political inertia are very high in Germany making determined 
institutional reforms, which would hurt large part of the electorate in the short run, a risky 
undertaking. It seems, in fact, that resistance to appropriate supply-side policies in particular 
on the labor market, but also on the goods and the capital market is so high in Germany that 
the walls of the fortress protecting insider prerogatives on all markets will, if at all, only 
crumble in times of a deep crisis. However, the current economic decline is so severe that the 
traditional German policy approach of muddling through might in fact no longer be possible. 
This is the time for Schumpeterian politicians to enter the stage and to organize a broad 
coalition of reform supporters. They must not only resist the temptation of giving in to the 
lobbying efforts of special interest groups but also inspire confidence in the public at large 
that bold structural reforms will pay off for almost everybody in the medium to longer run by 
reanimating the economic dynamism of Germany. 
 
As has been pointed out, reforming labor market institutions is only part of the economic 
policy package which is actually needed to tap the possible benefits of the new economy. 
Competitive goods and capital markets, especially a well-developed venture capital market, 
are also essential components just as well as a tax and social security system which do not 
stifle but rather spur entrepreneurial incentives.
22 The current policy of broadly raising taxes 
and social security contributions instead of cutting government expenditure on consumption 
to prevent the budget deficit from completely getting out of control is therefore self-defeating. 
It is bound to further reduce the potential of the German economy to produce GDP and 
employment growth.  
 
Another key policy area has also just been mentioned briefly so far, this is the education 
system. It is essential to prepare people for the challenges posed by structural change and the 
new economy when they are young because any repair activities involving adults such as 
active labor market policies are bound to be inefficient.
23 Life-long learning has become more 
important and can be improved in Germany, but the basic skills, such as reading, writing and 
                                                                                                                                                          
21 See Kortum and Lerner (1998), Belke and Fehn (2001), Belke, Fehn and Foster (2002) and Bednarzik (2001). 
22 See e.g. Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) and Fehn (2002). 
23 The inefficiency of most active labor market policies is by now so well documented that a separate discussion 
of this policy issue was omitted for the sake of saving space; see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), 
Lechner (1999), Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (2000) and Calmfors and Skedinger (1995).    42
versatility to cope with different tasks along with mathematical and communicative skills 
have to be acquired when people are young. Germans have boasted for a long time that their 
education system is supposedly one of the best among OECD countries. However, it is almost 
uncontroversial by now that there is plenty of room to improve the German university system. 
More surprisingly, the long-heralded German system of high-school education has also come 
under fire recently by the results of international tests such as PISA. Only the apprenticeship 
system of vocational training still seems to be to some extent an asset of  the education system 
by international comparison. Institutional reforms of the education system must therefore be 
high up on the economic policy agenda for preparing young Germans for the challenges posed 
by the new economy and for fostering entrepreneurial creativity. More competition and more 
decentralized decision making of schools and universities along with at least some form of 
tuition and an expanded system of scholarships should be parts of such a reform package.   43
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Figure 1: Development of unemployment in Germany
Source: Sinn (2002)






Figure 2: Employment-to-population ratio























Employment-to-population ratio: Employment divided by working age population (age 15-64)
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Figure 3: Beveridge Curve in Germany
 
Figure 4: Wage costs in
manufacturing
(female and male employees)







in DM per working hour




East Germany  
Portugal
Source: Sinn (2002)
   49
Figure 5: Employment rate in service and industrial 
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Figure 7: Total marginal taxation of labor
family with two employees and two children: one employee with average 
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Figure 9: Change in wage differentiation
(9th decile to 1st decile), 1985-1995






































Figure 10: Wages in “Neue Länder” 
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Legend: employees subject to social insurance contribution; seasonally adjusted; „West“ incl. West Berlin, „East“ incl. 
East Berlin. Source: Sinn (2002) 
Figure 11: Employment in West and East Germany
Jan. 1994 - July 2002, January 1994 = 100    

























Figure 12: Strictness of eligibility criteria































Source: Eichhorst, Profit and Thode (2001) 
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Figure 13: Suspension of unemployment
insurance payments
Remark: anually imposed suspensions in % of average amount of payment recipients
Possible reasons: lack of search, refusal to participate in active labor market policies, refusal of 
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Figure 14: Social assistance relative to avg. wage in West Germany
Employees in manufacturing, trade, banking and insurance sector
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Source: Sinn (2002)
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Figure 15: Social assistance relative to avg. wage in East Germany
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Source: Eichhorst, Profit and Thode (2001) 
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Figure 18: Regulation of labor and product markets
Source: Heckman (2002)
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Source: Eichhorst, Profit and Thode (2001)   57
APPENDIX 2: TABLES 
 
 
Table 2: Unemployment rates according to states






















Table 1: Development of structural unemployment
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
France 5.8 6.5 9.3 10.3 9.5
Finland 4.3 3.9 5.6 10.6 9.0
Germany 3.3 4.4 5.3 6.7 6.9
Japan 1.9 2.7 2.2 2.9 4.0
Netherlands 4.7 7.5 7.5 6.1 4.7
Great Britain 4.4 8.1 8.6 6.9 7.0
US 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.2
Remark: Structural Unemployment is measured by the concept of NAIRU (OECD 2000)
Source: Eichhorst, Profit and Thode (2001)   58
Table 3: Long-term unemployment
1983 1990 2000 2001
Finland 19.2 9.2 29.0 26.2
France 42.2 38.0 42.6 37.6
G e r m a n y 4 1 . 64 6 . 85 1 . 5n . a .
I t a l y 5 7 . 06 9 . 86 1 . 36 3 . 4
Netherlands 47.8 49.3 n.a. n.a.
S p a i n 5 2 . 45 4 . 04 7 . 64 4 . 0
UK 45.2 34.4 28.0 27.7
EU n.a. 48.6 46.9 43.7
J a p a n 1 3 . 31 9 . 12 5 . 52 6 . 6
US 13.3 5.5 6.0 6.1
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2002
  
Table 4: Unemployment in Germany by age
Source: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2002)
1993 1995 1997 1999
15-19 7.4 9.2 11.8 10.2
20-24 10.4 10.9 14.2 12.1
25-29 9.9 9.2 11.0 9.7
30-34 10.3 9.5 11.1 9.6
35-39 9.9 9.5 11.7 10.4
40-44 9.4 9.5 11.9 10.8
45-49 9.6 10.1 12.6 11.9
50-54 11.5 11.7 14.6 14.3
55-59 18.2 21.6 25.8 25.6
60-64 17.4 18.2 18.8 21.5
total 10.8 11.1 13.6 12.6
Remark: unemployment rate calculated with persons unemployed at 30th September relative to all 
employees subject to social insurance contribution at 30 June
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Table 5: Summary of unemployment insurance 
and unemployment assistance in Germany
Source: CESifo DICE (2002)
a) Benefit duration (BD) in months (PIPC=Periods of complusory insurance coverage)
Field of 
application
Em pl oyme nt 







the last 3 years
with children: 67%, 
without children 
60% (of average 
weekly wage for 














the last year or 
must be in need
with children 57%, 
without children 
53% of net earnings unlimited
PIPC 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
A G E - - - - 4 54 54 54 74 75 25 25 75 75 7
BD 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
 
Table 6: Indicators of the strictness of 
employment protection for regular employment
late 1980s late 1990s








United States 0.2 0.2
Australia 1.0 1.0
Japan 2.7 2.7
New Zealand na 1.7
Strictness of employment 
protection legislation
Source: Eichhorst, Profit and Thode (2001) 
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Table 7: Barriers to business formation across OECD countries
Source: Heckman (2002), Nicoletti et al. (1999)
# procedures 
required
days to get 
approval




Australia 3 3 0.2090 1.1
Canada 2 2 0.0140 0.8
France 16 66 0.1970 2.7
Germany 7 90 0.0851 2.1
Greece 13 53 0.4799 1.7
Italy 11 121 0.2474 2.7
Japan 11 50 0.1144 2.3
Netherlands 8 77 0.3031 1.4
New Zealand 3 17 0.0042 1.2
Spain 11 83 0.1269 1.8
Sweden 4 17 0.0254 1.8
Switzerland 12 88 0.1336 2.2
UK 7 11 0.0056 0.5
US 4 7 0.0096 1.3
 
Table 8: External capital markets across OECD countries









Australia 4 1 63.55 0.76
Canada 4 1 40.86 0.72
France 2 0 8.05 0.96
Germany 1 3 5.14 1.12
Greece 1 1 21.6 0.23
Italy 0 2 3.91 0.55
Japan 3 2 17.78 1.22
Netherlands 2 2 21.13 1.08
New Zealand 4 3 69.00 0.90
Spain 2 2 9.71 0.75
Sweden 2 2 12.66 0.55
Switzerland 1 1 33.85 -
UK 4 4 35.68 1.13
US 5 1 30.11 0.81
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Table 9: International comparison of venture capital markets
Source: Belke and Fehn (2002)
 Total in per mil of GDP “Early Stage“ in
per mil of GDP
In “high tech“-sector
in % of total
Countries 1986 1995 1999 1986 1995 1999  for 1995-1998 
Australia NA 1.336 0.600 NA 0.526 0.794 NA
Germany 0.031 0.375 1.300 0.007 0.063 0.462 28.8
France 0.194 0.336 1.180 0.032 0.027 0.362 24.1
Italy 0.021 0.295 0.490 0.011 0.071 0.148 7.0
Japan NA 0.216 0.150 NA 0.047 0.030 NA
Canada 0.206 0.855 2.530 0.082 0.376 1.113 NA
N. Zealand NA 0.517 0.410 NA 0.062 0.084 NA
Netherlands 0.532 1.433 2.450 0.127 0.304 0.744 27.5
Sweden 0.313 0.158 1.850 0.034 0.043 0.363 20.7
Switzerland 0.068 0.105 1.540 0.050 0.004 0.755 43.1
Spain 0.087 0.425 0.860 0.037 0.056 0.213 16.6
UK 0.793 1.033 1.880 0.194 0.042 0.203 23.6
US 0.556 0.638 4.470 0.058 0.191 1.78 79.0
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